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Comparing mutuality and solidarity in its application to disaster ethics 
Chamu Kuppuswamy 
Abstract  
Often it has been observed that in disaster situations, people (including victims) become 
altruistic and are very willing to listen, obey and act in a manner that would help bring an end 
to the situation. In this chapter, linking disaster ethics and human rights,  it is argued that this 
indeed is how it should be, disaster or otherwise, and that we have moral duties to oneself and 
to others. An individual exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster is 
indeed behaving as a reasonable Self, and exercising ethical individualism as per Gewirthian 
philosophy. It is the duty of the State and society to act as a supportive State and a caring 
society. In order to do this, we need to be conditioned for ethical rationality before any whiff 
of disaster arises, i.e. in our day-to-day conduct and decision-making, at a personal, 
institutional and transnational level. Our ethical resilience during disasters can only be as 
robust as our rational moral compass during ‘peace-time’. This chapter argues that Gewirthian 
solidarity ethics (GSE) should play a role in European policy and action in order to provide a 
system that conditions ethical rationality and in order to fulfil human rights.  This involves 
addressing our current understanding of human rights as distinct categories of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights and to effect a shift towards a more holistic understanding 
of human rights, whereby the hierarchy of fulfilment does not always prioritise civil and 
political rights.    
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Introduction  
Often it has been observed that in disaster situations, people (including victims) become 
altruistic and are very willing to listen, obey and act in a manner that would help bring an end 
to the situation. This observation applies differently to different people at different points in 
time – before, during or after the tragic event, but nevertheless there is a definite sense of 
solidarity, comradery and altruism that can be detected amongst those affected, amongst those 
responding and in some cases the onlookers. In this chapter, it is argued that this indeed is 
how it should be, disaster or otherwise, and that we have moral duties to oneself and to others. 
An individual exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster is indeed 
behaving as a reasonable Self, and exercising ethical individualism as per Gewirthian 
philosophy. It is the duty of the State and society to act as a supportive State and a caring 
society. It is also noted that in order for the right ethical decisions to be taken in response to 
disasters, we must already be conditioned to do so by embedding ethical rationality in our 
preparedness for disaster response, both from the individual point of view as well as the 
institutional perspective, and also be willing to espouse the same approach in the recovery 
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stages. In order to do this, we need to be conditioned for ethical rationality before any whiff of 
disaster arises, i.e. in our day-to-day conduct and decision-making, at a personal, institutional 
and transnational level. Our ethical resilience during disasters can only be as robust as our 
rational moral compass during ‘peace-time’.  This is the only reasonable expectation we can 
hold; anything beyond this is a bonus. But perhaps exceptionally, some behaviour during 
disaster situations can defy conditioning and make super humans of us.                  
This chapter argues that Gewirthian solidarity ethics (GSE) should play a role in European 
policy and action in order to provide a system that conditions ethical rationality and in order 
to fulfil human rights.  In the process, this involves addressing our current understanding of 
human rights as distinct categories of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and 
to effect a shift towards a more holistic understanding of human rights, whereby the hierarchy 
of fulfilment does not always prioritise civil and political rights.    
Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) is a deontological theory and states that we 
have moral duties to oneself and to others (Gewirth 1978). Gewirthian solidarity is understood 
as a categorical imperative, one without a choice, i.e. we are to accept that humans have a duty 
to protect and uphold human dignity, which, as Beyleveld states, is foundational to action 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001). In this paper, I argue that while there are numerous 
conceptions or assumptions about solidarity in official policy discourses, a notion of solidarity 
on which European solidarity needs to be built has to rely on a strong conception of solidarity 
as laid out by Gewirth and Beyleveld, if we are to ensure that it is in keeping with our 
obligations under human rights law. While the applicability of human rights law in the 
aftermath of disasters has not been so widely examined by regional or international human 
rights bodies (Barber 2008), it is justified to assume that human rights protection is still 
integral to disaster reponse. Mutuality in Gewirthian ethics is not reciprocal, but one based on 
‘basic needs’ and works hand in hand with a caring society and a supportive state. A moral 
structure is built around this idea of mutuality wherein human rights is actually a ‘community 
of rights’, and where there is a deep concern about the ‘freedom’ and ‘well-being’ of all 
members of society.  
 
Altruism and Solidarity in Disaster situations   
Widespread altruistic behaviour is observed in survivors of disasters as well as onlookers, both 
online and in-situ. This has been described as the ‘compulsion to help’ (Griswold 2013), such 
as when after the 9/11 attacks, people felt an overpowering sense to volunteer. Crowds have 
been observed as being benevolent during emergencies (Drury, Cocking and Reicher 2009). 
Recent research even argues for an altruistic brain (Pfaff 2015). In a study that looked into the 
likely responses by different groups to a bio-terrorist attack, it was found that officials would 
expect deviant behaviour, but individual citizens would mostly behave altruistically and 
rationally (Fischer III 2000; Donald & Cantor 1992).    
Solidarity is exhibited in groups and communities in various ways. The early reports that came 
out of the terrorist bombings in a Belgian airport and underground transport station in March 
2016 recount acts of altruism by victims towards other victims and of those who were not 
injured towards those affected by the incidents1. In 2007, during the London bombings, 
                                                          
1 http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/25/europe/brussels-terror-attack-survivors accessed 12th September 2017  
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/22/europe/belgium-brussels-attacks-witnesses/index.html accessed 12th 
September 2017  
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researchers found ‘high levels of mutual aid amongst survivors and witnesses of the bombings’ 
(Drury, Cocking and Reicher 2009). Selfishness was more common during the daily rush hour 
on the tube than during the London bombings on the tube, a telling observation about the 
desensitisation of individuals on a day-to-day basis. Following the November 2015 terrorist 
shootings in Paris, companies such as Google pitched in by making their internet call-service 
free of charge for a certain period. The altruistic behaviour of people in donating blood 
following the Madrid terrorist bombings in 2004, although not needed for such incidents, was 
nevertheless in response to an urge to help. A side effect of altruism is also observed. Altruism 
as a hindrance rather than a help is not uncommon in disaster situations, and points to the 
duty that exists on members of society to take informed decisions about actions. This 
inadvertent hindrance can be averted by Gewirthian self-interested rational agents, because 
their exercise of ‘moderate altruism’ (Gewirth 1998, 88), does not discount the duty to inform 
oneself.    
In the aftermath of the chemical gas attack in Halabja in northern Iraq in 1988, in the absence 
of any institutional response, the people of the town buried the dead, demonstrating the 
poignancy of altruism when their own government ordered the disaster (Hart and Clevestig 
2009). During the Tokyo sarin gas attack by the group Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, the lack of 
obvious signs as to the nature of the attack meant that the first responders to victims were 
their fellow travellers (Pangi 2002). Reports of callous behaviour of passengers towards 
‘passengers in discomfort’ on the trains in Tokyo could be explained by the fact that there was 
no obvious sign of an attack. Murakami, in his book that recounts interviews of victims and 
responders, talks about passengers wanting to distance themselves from the situation by 
changing trains (Murakami 2000). Perhaps this behaviour is at the cusp of the ‘daily 
commuter syndrome’ of indifference and the altruistic individual phenomenon that occurs 
during an obvious disaster.                       
Policies that respond to disasters in Europe take into account these behaviours and 
accommodate, indeed count on, altruism and solidarity. Various initiatives such as EU Aid 
volunteers provide outlets for such altruism in a structured manner. In the 2009 chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) plan adopted by the EU Commission, the principle 
of solidarity exists as a top level principle. States have the responsibility primarily in protecting 
against CBRN threats, but EU initiatives are guided by the EU solidarity principle (Council of 
the European Union 2009). Article 222 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) incorporates the ‘spirit of solidarity’ in order to bring together the resources of 
European states to respond to disasters, and is being infused into the CBRN action plan 
(Konstadinides 2013, 475). In the US, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
highlights the need to develop a ‘Culture of Preparedness’, and it seems natural to assume 
solidarity as integral to this culture. While the US is politically less enamoured by solidarity, it 
has embedded solidarity in its culture of preparedness statement – which incorporates 
‘vocabularies of cultural change’ Culture of information sharing between departments as 
opposed to a culture of need to know. Although not a radical step in solidarity, but a essential 
first step towards it.              
Solidarity amongst niche victim groups, as a result of tragedy, can also be potent in the context 
of disaster relief and prevention. The notion of moderate altruism is stretched to its limit to 
accept and support such groups, and such acceptance should be based on self-interested 
rationality, i.e. as a necessity, at the very minimum. Families Against Terrorism and 
Extremism (FATE) talks of resilience as a way out of the pain, shame and guilt of a loved one 
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being involved in terrorist activities by helping prevent others from getting involved. The 
Network of Associations for Victims of Terrorism (NAVT) has as one of its aims to promote 
solidarity with victims of terrorism and better citizenry. The Common Bond Project promotes 
solidarity among young people who are victims of terrorism.  
Reasonable Self, Ethical Individualism  
Alan Gewirth, a Chicago philosopher, and a neo-Kantian theorist, has elaborated the PGC (the 
Principle of Generic Consistency) theory which supports the self-chosen purpose of an 
individual, and in order for it to be achieved, states that that the individual, who is generalized 
as an ‘agent’ has what is called generic needs. The rights to generic needs are known as generic 
rights. It would not be rationally possible to deny these rights for oneself as an agent or for any 
other who displays the characteristics of an agent with a self-chosen purpose . Freedom and 
well-being are seen as generic needs in order for the agent to be able to act at all. Gewirth uses 
a dialectically necessary method to arrive at generic needs. The dialectically necessary method 
is as follows: If A is an agent, i.e. wanting to act for a voluntarily chosen purpose, then A should 
also accept (to herself,  that she values the purpose so as to aspire to achieve it. By combining 
the dialectic method with logic, Gewirth then arrives at the position that what is true for 
oneself as an agent, i.e. the need to have generic needs fulfilled, should also be true for all 
agents. Hence a logical link is created with other agents. Gewirth also uses a  dialectically 
contingent method to arrive at generic rights. In it, he states that the  framework of human 
rights is predicated on the notion of  generic rights. This will be picked up in the next section 
when discussing the state and society as a supportive state and a caring society.                    
So, to sum up, the PGC states that 
“A person is generically inconsistent or inconsistent in a fundamental way, if, while 
exercising his own capacities of agency, he rejects, either in thought or in action, the 
possession or exercise of those capacities on the part of other persons”   
Based on the PGC theory, Gewirth elaborates various concepts such as the Reasonable Self, 
Ethical Individualism, Supportive State and Caring Society. these concepts  have been 
referred to earlier, and will be explained and discussed in this section. Solidarity expressed as 
altruistic behaviour was the subject of the discussion in the earlier section illustrating 
responses to disasters. This section will involve analysing solidarity as ethical individualism 
and altruistic behaviour  as rational ethical conduct. . Solidarity is further analysed in terms 
of  its acceptable extent, under the notion of moderate altruism.           
A Reasonable Self can be understood as a generically consistent agent. The notion of a 
Reasonable Self is a perspectival construction.  It is constructed from the the point of view of 
a community. So from the perspective of the community, the generically consistent agent in 
the PGC statement is a Reasonable Self. In order to understand the Reasonable Self, a 
comparison with the Hobbesian notion of self will help. A Reasonable Self  is very different to 
a Hobbesian Self in that the Hobbesian Self is more atomistic in her individualism. A 
Hobbesian Self would be generically inconsistent and would not be exercising ethical 
individualism. The Reasonable Self recognises that there is a rational basis for treating others’ 
needs as having some bearing on the fulfilment of one’s own needs.  
Because of the contributions made to an individual by society, the individual, to an extent, is  
a ‘social product’, which is Gewirth’s social contribution thesis (Gewirth 1996, 83). An 
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individual then recognizes that he or she has an obligation towards society because of society’s 
contribution to their agency. Ethical Individualism is therefore egoistic in that ‘all persons are 
helped to develop their abilities of agency, is regarded by each individual simply as the price 
she must pay to fulfil these personal rights for herself’, and the ‘society should be so structured 
institutionally that it promoted equal rights and mutuality’ (Gewirth 1996, 85). Collectively, 
the notions of the Reasonable Self, Social Contribution thesis and Ethical individualism form  
Gewirthian solidarity ethics (GSE) . The current framework of human rights acts as a barrier 
to GSE and to achieving solidarity as a policy goal. While the philosophical understanding that 
human rights are indivisible are embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
European Convention has a much restricted view of rights, mainly confined to the first 
generation of human rights.  
 Therefore civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights are one but different in name. 
They are interrelated and indivisible. In GSE there is no need to make a reference to these 
differences. But from the political and legal point of view, this is essential for an understanding 
of how GSE can have a true harmonising impact to bring about a broad and year-round 
European disaster ethics policy. The artificial division between positive (social, economic and 
cultural) and negative rights (civil and political) is a barrier in fully realising solidarity as a 
policy goal. GSE too prioritises rights, but not in a similar fashion to the human rights regime. 
Gewirth lays out a hierarchy of needs (basic, non-subtractive and additive goods), these 
categories of needs do not coincide fully with the human rights notion of first, second and third 
generation human rights.   
Mutuality as the nature of positive rights         
To fully understand how the Reasonable Self behaves, one must turn to the notion of 
mutuality. Mutuality has a definite basis in non-reciprocity in Gewirthian ethics.  
While reciprocity can be understood as tit for tat – equal amounts of something exchanged 
between two persons – mutuality should be understood as giving or receiving something so as 
to secure to the other his or her generic rights. Full stop.    
The other aspects that distinguish mutuality from reciprocity are:  
1. In a mutual relationship, giving or receiving can be one directional, but in a reciprocal 
relationship, B gives something to A only if A has something to give or has given 
something to B.  
2. In a relation of reciprocity, the beneficiaries are limited to one’s prior benefactors, 
unlike in mutuality, where they are owed to all agents.   
Because of mutuality, we see the conception that generic rights are connected in action, or in 
other words mutuality animates the community of rights, as an essential basis for the 
existence, development and flourishing of a community of agents. Mutuality puts solidarity on 
a rational basis. Solidarity cements a community in a lasting fashion.  
Picking up on the contingent argument for human rights developed by Gewirth and also by 
Beyleveld and Brownsword, the argument goes that as the global community (States, 
individuals and other non-natural persons) has acknowledged the existence of human rights, 
most notably through the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequently 
through numerous human rights treaties, it can be shown, using a dialectically contingent 
argument that human rights are nothing but a crystallisation of generic needs of agency 
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(GNA). Human rights then acquire a rational foundation. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001) 
argue that it follows from the acceptance of human rights that legal systems that recognise 
human rights must treat the PGC as a necessary criterion of legal validity, on pain of denying 
that they recognise human rights.  
In the light of PGC, positive rights need to be fulfilled just as much as negative rights in order 
to create conditions for day-to-day altruism and solidarity. States risk being incongruent if 
they do not assume this position. Recognising positive rights is conducive to mutuality, as it 
supports mutuality-based solidarity behaviour by agents on a day-to-day basis. Such mundane 
solidarity, and more of it, is key to solidarity during disasters.                
Positive and negative rights are used to distinguish and justify different types of human rights 
obligations owed by states to the recipients, and increasingly other entities that may have 
obligations under human rights law.  The argument is that human rights that are negative in 
nature impose less onerous obligations on the State, for example for the fulfilment of the 
freedom of speech, it only requires that the State does not intervene. In contrast, for the 
fulfillment of the right to food, there is a need to invest resources on a large scale. While there 
are differences in how different human rights are fulfilled, that there is a qualitative difference 
between the two categories is not convincing. Even in the case of fulfillment of negative rights, 
the costs can be huge given that enforcement mechanisms need to be put in place, such as the 
provision for a judiciary and the police. Viewed from the Gewirthian perspective, a rational 
justification for positive rights provides more support for the resources spent, their core being 
embedded in mutuality, otherwise there is an inherent contradiction in the system. Acceptance 
of positive rights provides a justification for mundane solidarity to be practiced and reinforced.  
    
The recognition of positive rights in a society makes the practice of Gewirthian solidarity ethics 
more natural, thereby creating conditions that make solidarity-based disaster reponse a 
default paradigm. This is closely reflected in the ‘resilience paradigm’, which spans ‘from 
comprehensive disaster management through disaster-resistant community, disaster-
resilient communities, sustainable development, sustainable hazards mitigation, invulnerable 
development, to comprehensive vulnerability management’ McEntire et al. (2002) Manyena 
(2006).  
 
In terms of the scope of altruism, writing in his last book Self-Fulfillment, Gewirth (1998) 
argues that the standard that is set is not one of a saint, but that of a self-interested individual. 
Such is the expression of the trait of moderate altruism. Ethical individualism focusses on 
expanding the self, while moderate altruism approaches this from the perspective of balancing 
the interests of the Self and the other. Prospective purposive agents or, in other words, 
Gewirthian actors should provide for the vulnerable while taking care of one’s own needs as 
well as ‘aspiration-fulfillment’. A fuller conception of ‘aspiration-fulfillment’ and its place in 
purposive action of agents is precluded in this short exposition of GSE.   
 
Supportive State and Caring Society 
Gewirthian actors exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster are indeed 
behaving as moral and rational agents and their impact depends on institutional frameworks 
as well as their own effort. It is the duty of the State, to shape itself around such a reasonable 
Self to protect and promote a Reasonable Self, ever present to reinforce this idea by the 
development of responsive institutions. The state and society need to provide the scaffolding 
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by being a Supportive State and a Caring Society in order to increase the chances that all agents 
are fulfilled in their human rights as much of the time as possible, and this includes during 
disasters.  
At one level, being a Supportive State means that the state supports other states by supporting 
itself and others during times of disasters. (Inigo chapter 9 of this book, page 5), on the other 
hand, it means that it has a human rights framework that it supports. Duties and obligations 
of States arise from generic rights that are embedded in policy as human rights. A Supportive 
State has an obligation to develop Positive Rights and Negative Rights. In discussing the 
indirect application of the PGC, Gewirth requires the transition from a minimal state to a 
Supportive State. The Supportive State should give more of a role for the crowd to render help 
during emergencies (Drury et al. 2009) so that the institutional structure that harbours 
Gewirthian agents supports mutualism, and not egoism (Gewirth 1996). Gewirth (1996) points 
out that the distribution of political power is a decisive factor, and hence the responsibility is 
institutional rather than individual.   
The debate on negative and positive rights, or first and second generation human rights, has 
been too long mired in geopolitical debates between the capitalist and the socialist countries. 
There is a real need for a holistic conception of human rights, as inequality increases in every 
society and the welfare state wanes. The recognition of positive rights will provide a stronger 
footing for an altruistic state. The General Assembly resolution on Promotion and protection 
of human rights in post-disaster and post-conflict situations in 2013 requests human rights 
‘mainstreaming’ in disaster relief in all its members states, including in Europe (UNGA 2013).  
In 2015, the final report of the Human Rights Advisory Committee to the United Nations 
General Assembly on mainstreaming human rights into disaster responses stated: 
Rights relating to the basic necessities of life (in particular relating to food, drinking 
water, shelter, clothing, adequate health services and sanitation), physical security and 
integrity (protection of the right to life and the right to be free of assault, rape, arbitrary 
detention and kidnapping, and threats to these rights), civil and political protection 
needs (rights to religious freedom and freedom of speech, personal documentation, 
political participation, access to courts, and freedom from discrimination ) and other 
economic, social and cultural protection needs (such as access to education, to receive 
restitution or compensation for lost property and to work ) should be protected and 
respected through the design and implementation of concrete initiatives and 
mechanisms at all levels. 
It is clear that the UN lays emphasis on positive and negative human rights. In the event of a 
CBRN incident, the application of human rights, both positive and negative, still stay 
important and should be equally protected. What the Gewirthian framework provides is a 
means of prioritising the needs, in a way that positive rights are not always disadvantaged. 
Gewirth lays out a hierarchy of needs known as basic, non-subtractive and additive needs. 
Basic needs compass features that are needed for the very possibility of action, including life 
itself, providing the capability to be involved in making choices and the possession of mental 
equilibrium sufficient to enable one to these. Non-subtractive needs are features needed to be 
able to act successfully, without thereby being needed for the very possibility of acting. 
Additive needs are features that are needed to be able to improve one’s capacities for successful 
action, regardless of one’s purposes. These needs are conceptualised hierarchically based on 
the possibility of successful action, therefore in the case of conflict for fulfilment of needs, 
rights to non-subtractive needs outweigh rights to additive needs, and the rights to basic needs 
outweigh non-subtractive and additive needs. A number of sustainable development goals 
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(SDGs) enshrine objectives that will help secure basic needs. SDG 1 and 2 require states to 
commit to eradicating poverty and hunger, SDG 3 commits states to working to achieve good 
health for its citizens. Non subtractive needs include decent work (SDG 8), education (SDG 4) 
gender equality (SDG 5). Additive needs include participation in partnerships for success of 
goals, climate action, etc. The report rightly supports a pivotal role for women in disaster 
situations. It is clear that women play an important role in the achievement of Sustainable 
development goals, by playing a disproportionate role in issues such as food security. Their 
ability to act in a mutually reciprocal manner warrants their special status as rational agents.        
 
Solidarity plays a role in European security policy. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), Article 222 calls upon member states to work together to assist one 
another in the event of a terrorist attack, a man-made disaster or a natural disaster. While this 
is a necessary inclusion in the policy, there is room for criticism. The reference to a ‘spirit of 
solidarity’ in Article 222 can be seen as a weak provision, with the potential to be trumped by 
weaker values. However the reference to joint action is refreshing and acts as a mellowing 
factor to a potentially watered down solidarity requirement. GSE would require that post-
disaster recovery should continue to see the Supportive State in action. Konstantines (2013) 
rightly argues that the positioning of Article 222 in the Treaty is indicative of its limited 
significance, casting doubts on solidarity as a policy goal. A clearer approach to Article 222 
would be to read ‘the solidarity clause in terms of a kind of mutual insurance tool able to 
minimize the risks at a common minimal cost but not in any case an altruistic tool created in 
order to provide aid for those countries that are not able to face the challenges posed by major 
crisis situations on their own’. (Inigo chapter 9 of this book, page 5)           
It is in the remit of the Supportive State to not hinder, but support the development of caring 
communities. Disaster relief can be called for unexpectedly and in unknown scales, therefore 
having caring communities to call upon can provide for fulfillment of agents’ needs. However,    
CBRNE incidents bring out rational and moral behaviours of individuals irrespective of a 
widespread caring community that exists, and this is a point made earlier through examples 
of actual incidents of bombings in major European capitals, terrorist shooting in Paris and 
chemical attacks in Iraq and Tokyo. In order to address the peculiarities of the relationship 
between CBRNE, mutuality and solidarity, three points need to be made.  First, that the 
incident and the immediate aftermath attract the most mutuality underpinned actions.  
Second, the knowledge that it is a CBRNE incident is essential to kindle the mutualistic 
propensity. Finally, solidarity in its deepest form, i.e. mutuality has more chance of being 
spontaneously displayed during a CBRNE event than during other events that triggers 
altruistic behaviour.  
Caring communities are motivated and organized (Cretney 2016). It is interesting that in some 
less ordered societies, state officials (acting as if in their private capacity) can exhibit much 
more rational ethical behaviour than in the case of officials of developed States. This is perhaps 
based on cultural values that pervade strongly in many societies. Cultural values in societies 
can play a strong role in ethical behaviour for resilience  (Kenney and Phibbs 2015). The role 
of social organisations in organizing relief has become increasingly better and important in 
the context of disaster relief. Groups have shown independence in defining the resilience 
framework they need. In this context, communities need to proactively work to infuse ‘caring’ 
and shape what this means for their work. There is lack of clarity in the indicators for 
community resilience because of the neglected status of community resilience (Manyena 
2016). Central to Gewirth’s conception of caring communities is his social contribution thesis. 
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This thesis should help apportion obligations and shape appropriate indicators for community 
resilience. Community resilience should work better on mutualistic foundations as was 
demonstrated in the Dunedin earthquake mobilization in a locality that was badly hit 
(Manyena 2016). Sustainable Development Goal 11 provides a mutualistic framework, in 
keeping with Gewirthian social contribution thesis. By 2030, it aims to enhance capacity for 
participatory human settlement planning and management in all countries, thereby providing 
individuals the opportunity to give back to the communities and fulfil their role as mutual 
agents (SDG 2015). All members of society are enrolled into social contributions, except that 
the social contribution thesis does not operate in its full scope for those born into extreme 
deprivation, because unless they are helped by society first, they are not able to become 
productive agents, to then take on responsibilities.                   
The right to development (RtD) is pertinent in the discussion of caring communities. RtD is a 
controversial third generation human right. Gewirth stakes a claim via the social contribution 
thesis for a ‘collective right of the community to an institutionalised system of support from 
those it has benefited’, which could be very much likened to RtD. This is an interesting way to 
demonstrate a caring community, i.e by demanding something. But that is the reality and 
complexity of communities. The caring community gives as well as takes, so as to be able to 
give, and take!     
 
Caring communities play a role in reducing the impact of future disasters. The adaptive 
capacity of the caring communities is greater than that of non-caring communities. Pre-
disaster community activities contribute to better community resilience, and these are 
examples of Gewirthian caring communities in action, operating with heightened awareness 
that disasters are part of modern societies. Social support and social participation have been 
identified as elements of pre-disaster societies that have helped respond and adapt post-
disaster (Cretney 2016). Working towards SDG 11 to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable would go a long way in realising Gewirthian values. A key target, by 2020, is to 
substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and 
implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line 
with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk 
management at all levels (SDG 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
Construing solidarity as Gewirthian mutuality in disaster ethics creates a rational human 
rights framework that operates as a ‘community of rights’. It provides a worthy framework 
during a difficult situation where moral decisions are taken within a structure already made 
conducive to human rights and human dignity. Mutuality is a key human rights concept, 
manifesting in the recognition and promotion of positive human rights law in a Supportive 
State and provides continuity between resilience and disaster paradigms. The role of 
communities in disaster relief and resilience is often ignored or only grudgingly tolerated, 
however Gewirthian solidarity ethics places the community in an integral position for the 
fulfilment of human rights. This chapter seeks to reconcile altruistic behaviour with a human 
rights framework that recognises and builds upon this phenomenon.                  
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